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THE SECURITY-DEVELOPMENT NEXUS AFTER THE COLD WAR

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ABSTRACT

Interested in identifying the decisive elements behind contemporary conceptions of the security-development nexus, this article investigates how this relationship gained new meanings in the post-Cold War period. Firstly, we present a brief discussion on the nexus between security and development during the Cold War. We then question the interdependent processes that permeate this nexus in contemporary times: changes in the scope of UN peacebuilding operations, the emergence of concepts such as human security and human development, and, finally, the securitization of international aid and its articulation with the concept of a failed state. Thus, our contribution assumes that the current understanding of the security-development nexus in the post-Cold War era remains dynamic and open to analytical interpretation, requiring further studies.

Keywords: Security. Development. Post-Cold War Period.

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INTRODUCTION

In the field of International Relations, for the longest time security and development were treated as independent issues, to be addressed in different spaces of discussion. This stems from the fact that, in the international system born after the Second World War, there was an architectural divide between bodies responsible for security matters and bodies associated with development. The initial make-up of the United Nations (UN) system demonstrated, for example, that problems related to peace and security would not be addressed by the same entities dealing with socioeconomic development (TSCHIRGI, 2005).

Although often regarded as a characteristic of the *new world order* of the early 1990s, the nexus between security and development is not entirely new, having its origins in the Cold War era. During this period, according to Haag (2004), development policies were not specifically used to reduce the potential for violent conflicts. Nevertheless, they focused on generating economic growth and ensuring the political loyalty of so-called developing countries. In other words, development was indirectly present in strategic-issue agendas, paving the way for other dimensions and effects of the security-development nexus.

This dynamic can be observed in the UN peacekeeping missions, which were first conceptualized as strategic military interventions aimed at conflict resolution. Especially from the mid-1980s, in a changing international context, these operations started to absorb activities traditionally not associated with the military sphere, their primary aim being the protection and welfare of individuals on the basis of expanding the possibilities of human development.

During the first decade of the 21st century, Brazil, for example, emerged as a relevant player in this field, claiming to have a different attitude towards the connection between security and development in peacekeeping missions. The Brazilian intervention would mix a "robust" use of military forces with developmental cooperation projects, in a relationship between 'hard' and 'soft' power regarded by many as distinctive. This gave rise to the expectation that a "Brazilian paradigm" for peacekeeping operations would be established, considering the country's role in the United Nations Stabilization Mission in Haiti (MINUSTAH).

Interested in identifying some elements of contemporary conceptions about the relationship between security and development,

this article investigates how this relationship took on new contours in the post-Cold War period. The text starts with a brief preparatory discussion on the nexus between security and development during the Cold War era. This highlights some important precedents, similarities and differences vis-à-vis the current make-up. We then go on to discuss relationship between security and development in the post-Cold War period, presented through three interdependent situations: changes in the scope of UN peacebuilding operations, the rise of human security and human development as operational concepts, and, finally, the securitization of international aid, mediated by the concept of a 'failed state.' Thus, through this article, our intention is not only to present some characteristic elements of the relationship between security and development in the post-Cold War period, but also to demonstrate that debates on this problem are still open, meriting further studies.

THE SECURITY-DEVELOPMENT NEXUS DURING THE COLD WAR

Even though by the end of the 20th century International Relation analyzes on the link between security and development had been expanded, the origins of this conceptual association date back to the pre-Cold War era. In foreign policies carried out in the aftermath of World War II, for instance, security, development and their interrelationships were determining institutional-environment factors, affecting international cooperation in terms of objectives and strategies, volume of mobilized resources, geographical patterns and sectoral distribution (SANAHUJA; SCHÜNEMANN, 2012).

Although punctual, the analysis of the origins and motivations underlying international aid during the Cold War does not have to limit itself to investigating how security and development discourses and practices favored certain forms of intervention as appropriate and legitimate. It can also demonstrate how these two concepts are constructed on the basis of an increasingly dialogical relationship, although both have experienced significant variations over the years.

Throughout the 20th century, the relationship between security and development and the idea of "human security" was operationalized by both the United States (USA) and the Soviet Union (USSR). As such, the main powers' cooperation programmes and financing initiatives were

closely linked to security interests and debates. Examples of this dynamic can be found in the priorities established by US cooperation projects under the guise of the Marshall Plan, in 1947; the Mutual Security Act of 1950 (the first aid-related American legislation for the Third World); the Alliance for Progress, launched during the 1960s (a financing strategy for Latin America carried out by the Kennedy government; it was also a reaction to the Cuban Revolution and, to a certain extent, to Juscelino Kubitschek's Pan-American Operation – OPA)[3]; the Reagan administration's initiatives in Central America and Central Asia during the mid-1980s (SANAHUJA, 2005)[4]. At the same time, the countries of the socialist bloc – which represented a quarter of the world's population – were excluded from US assistance projects for political and ideological reasons (HIRST; ANTONINI, 2011).

The subordination of foreign aid to security objectives was not an exclusivity of the United States, considering the USSR's external aid to Gamal A. Nasser's government in Egypt (1954-1970), and the Soviet programs for Cuba, Nicaragua, Ethiopia and Vietnam, all under the COMECON (Council for Mutual Economic Assistance), founded in 1949. In this sense, general tendencies towards the securitization of development were already present in the forms of cooperation advanced by the great powers during the Cold War (SANAHUJA, 2005). Such examples are illustrative of dynamics that were only strengthened by the Cold War: developmental solutions were regarded as a "political support currency," while the institutionalization of such forms of "aid" created "a bureaucratic exercise in the execution of development cooperation and financing programs" (OLIVEIRA, 2016, p. 13, our translation).

Beyond American and Soviet operations, international developmental aid coming from other industrialized countries and multilateral organizations was also strongly conditioned by their

[3] The Pan American Operation is considered one of the first Brazilian diplomacy initiatives to demonstrate a close connection between economic development and the conditions for hemispheric security. In a letter to US President Dwight Eisenhower in May 1958, President Juscelino Kubitschek indicated the need for an urgent review of inter-American relations, inclusive of pro-development lines of cooperation in which the United States was a stakeholder. Such a stance was essential, even, to remove the risk in Latin America of contagion from so-called "foreign ideologies" such as communism (LESSA, 2008).

[4] For a more detailed analysis on the relationship between the distribution of US foreign aid and its security priorities from the Marshall Plan to the immediate post-Cold War era, see: SANAHUJA, José Antonio. Ayuda económica y seguridad nacional. La ayuda de Estados Unidos, del Plan Marshall a la posguerra fría. Madrid, Entimema/Facultad de Ciencias Políticas y Sociología, Universidad Complutense de Madrid, 1999.

positions in matters of international policy and security, even when this aid was not directly military in character (HIRST; ANTONINI, 2011). Here, the role of institutions such as the World Bank in combating poverty in developing countries should be emphasized. The Bank's priorities were finely attuned to the strategy of containing socialism in the Cold War context. It is noteworthy that, for most of this period, the president of the World Bank was Robert McNamara (1968-1981), US Secretary of Defense during the John F. Kennedy and Lyndon B. Johnson governments and one of the main architects of the Vietnam War. McNamara was also one of the World War II veterans who participated in the reconstruction of the Ford Motor Company after the conflict, even acting as its president before becoming Secretary of Defense.[5] "McNamara, therefore, was another specialist whose experiences spanned matters of war and market both; he was now focused on formulating policies aimed at poverty in emerging economies," in a strong consonance with the prevailing security interests of the Cold War period (OLIVEIRA, 2016, p. 193, our translation).

In 1967, during a speech in Montreal, McNamara emphasized the need for establishing an association between development and national security doctrine. The following year, he published the book *The Essence of Security*, in which this doctrine is explained. In a very illustrative excerpt, McNamara states that

> [s]ecurity is development. Without development, there can be no security. A developing nation that does not in fact develop simply cannot remain "secure" … If security implies anything, it implies a minimal measure of order and stability. Without internal development of at least a minimal degree, order and stability are simply not possible … (McNAMARA, 1968, p. 158 apud COMBLIN, 1978, p. 65).

By explaining the inseparability of security and development and pointing out the intrinsic character of this relationship in so-called developing nations, McNamara saw security as the daughter of development, understanding development as an "economic, social, and

[5] "McNamara's curriculum included a degree in economics from Berkeley and a Business degree from Harvard, where he became a professor in the early 1940s at the tender age of 24. There he had significant contact with quantitative methods such as statistics and database accumulation, which he skillfully applied to management plans and administration techniques, treating it as a way to control uncertain situations and make difficult decisions" (OLIVEIRA, 2016, p. 193, our translation).

political progress." While stating that "the specific military problem is only a narrow facet of the broader security problem," he stressed that it would be a mistake to continue to believe in security as "exclusively military phenomena", primarily reliant on "military hardware." McNamara insisted that military force could help guarantee public order, but only with the people's collaboration. Thus, security also came to be seen as a result of order and economic and social stability: "Law and order is a shield, behind which the central fact of security – development – can be achieved." (MCNAMARA, 1968, p. 158 apud COMBLIN, 1978, p. 65-66).

McNamara launched the aforementioned book in the same year his mandate in the World Bank began, but these ideas had already been expounded before in the speech he gave in 1967, in Montreal, while he was still Secretary of Defense.[6] Based on this doctrine, McNamara went above and beyond merely influencing the security and development policies of the great powers and large international-aid organizations: his proposal also carried significant weight in the discourse of military governments during the Cold War. Until that moment, these governments had avoided the debate on development, considering it the territory of populist governments. For the orthodox military, any link between security and development was suspect. "However, since McNamara accepted it as true, all objections fell apart" (COMBLIN, 1978, p. 65-66, our translation).[7]

It is also worth noting that the application of development aid themes and modalities by the World Bank was frequently associated with initiatives by United Nations agencies and organisms. As one example, the issuance of concessionary credits to the poorest countries – adopted by the Bank in the 1970s under McNamara's presidency – had already received its first impetus in the 1950s, through the Special Fund for Economic Development, which was later dissolved to give way to the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP). The same pattern repeated itself on several other occasions, whenever the developmental issues of emerging

[6] McNamara's speech is available at the following address: <https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/00396336608440653>. Accessed on: Jan. 10, 2019.

[7] Marshal Castello Branco's speech in the Brazilian National War College's (Escola Superior de Guerra) inaugural class of 1967 is seen as an example of the synergy between McNamara's proposals and some military governments. In line with McNamara's doctrine, Castello Branco posited that the relationship between security and development would take on the form of a "mutual causality," stating that "the inter-relation between development and security signifies that, on the one hand, a country's level of security is conditioned by its economic-growth potential and rate. And, on the other, that economic development cannot occur without a minimum of security" (BRASIL, 1967, our translation).

countries became the focus. Examples are the Decade of Development goals in the 1960s, the basic needs development strategy in the 1970s, as well as various forms of aid in the fields of human rights, gender and peacebuilding (HIRST; ANTONINI, 2011).

The great powers' views on the security-development nexus during the Cold War found shelter in analyzes by representatives of the Realist School. In the North American case, for example, works by Hans Morgenthau (*A Political Theory of Foreign Aid*, 1962), Samuel P. Huntington (*Foreign Aid for What and for Whom*, 1970) and George Kennan (*Aid as a National Policy*) stand out. Generally speaking, these authors sought to understand how development aid policies were connected with national foreign policy agendas, including their interface with domestic actors, especially in the case of the USA. What stands out in these analyzes is the idea that foreign aid should be used in favor of soft power, that is, aid should be seen as an instrument of power. Development aid would be an important foreign policy tool, helping foreign powers build and stabilize alliances and ensuring a favorable balance of power.

The reduction in development aid offered by the USA in the immediate post-Cold War period demonstrates how the operationalization of this foreign policy tool was primarily guided by security objectives linked to anti-communism. However, the large US aid packages nowadays provided to countries in the Middle East, such as Israel and Egypt, also demonstrates the continued link between strategic security objectives and aid. Another example can be found in the increase in development aid offered by the USA to the Andean countries since the mid-1980s. This took place in the context of the war against drugs, when it became a national security priority (SANAHUJA, 2005; SANAHUJA; SCHÜNEMANN, 2012). With the above said, in the following sections we will discuss some determining factors of the security-development nexus in contemporaneity.

THE SECURITY-DEVELOPMENT NEXUS IN POST-COLD WAR PEACEBUILDING OPERATIONS

Although the idea that security and development are linked is hardly new, the end of the bipolar conflict which characterized the Cold War enabled new conceptualizations about the new prospective conditions for a stable world order. More than that, the discussion on what should be the focus of security – that is, who should be protected – came back to the

fore. Consequently, the most diverse international actors had to assume different attitudes towards "new threats" to so-called global governance.[8]

In 1989, the US magazine *The National Interest* published "The End of History?", an article by Francis Fukuyama written before he assumed his mandate in the US State Department. For the author, the failure of state socialism (Marxism-Leninism) would consolidate and universalize Western liberal democracy as the ultimate form of government. Fukuyama seeks solace in Hegel to support his argument that the victory and universalization of liberal democracy meant that ideological struggle would be a thing of the past. Thus, for a section of liberal internationalism, the new world order would be defined by "democratic peace," based on an international system supported by the expansion of capitalism and democracy and by the dissemination of universal values such as human rights. Fukuyama was part of a group of authors from the most diverse theoretical currents who believed that the end of the Cold War meant that the main threat against international order – major conflicts between states – was over.

This represented a new paradigm for discussions on world peace and security, lending renewed strength to discourse in favor of the joint action of states in the name of universal values, so conflicts compromising the world order could be overcome. According to a declaration by President Bush in 1991, the US government's military action against Iraq that year was not meant to conquer Kuwait, but rather a push towards a new world order, with the lofty goal of protecting universal human values (RODRIGUES, 2012).

The international scenario that had risen since the early years of the post-Cold War period saw a growth of debates and interventions in international security. The latter was no longer viewed as purely conditioned by military factors and by the balance of power between major economies. If the fall of the Berlin Wall and the end of the USSR quelled fears of a direct military conflict between the 20th century's two major powers, in the course of the following decades other themes gained prominence in governmental agendas and international organizations. The reformulation of the concept of international security was prompted

[8] Global governance can be defined as "a group of institutions and regulations based on universal values, in which nation-states partake, focused on managing problems that no isolated government – even the most powerful – can deal with" (RODRIGUES, 2012, p. 31-2, our translation).

by a precipitation of threats to global governance, such as terrorism (especially variants linked to religious fundamentalism), various forms of trafficking (drugs, armaments, people), internal and trans-territorial conflicts (such as civil wars and genocides), extreme poverty, large-scale epidemics, massive displacement of populations, human rights violations and environmental degradation.[9]

According to the British social scientist Barry Buzan (2007, p. 38) – a representative of the so-called Copenhagen School – a new scenario had presented itself: the security of collectivities organized in the state system would now be affected by other determinations, in addition to military ones. These would be related to political (institutional stability and legitimacy), economic (access to the basic resources needed for the maintenance of welfare and institutions), societal (preservation of language, customs, religion) and environmental factors (maintenance of the biosphere, essential for the development of the other factors).

Thus, UN actions undertaken since the 1990s – including stabilization and peacekeeping missions – have been affected by these novel conceptions of international security. Countries such as Brazil have increased their engagement in peacekeeping missions, not only because of a favorable internal scenario, but also because of an expansion in the number of UN peacekeeping operations after the rearrangement of the Security Council and the evolution of the international geopolitical system in the post-Cold War era (NASSER, 2012):

> The years following the end of the Cold War saw a massive entry of the UN into the field of peacekeeping operations, mainly due to the outbreak of several intrastate conflicts in so-called Third World countries. If collective security had previously been threatened mostly by external expansionist pretensions, now it became a frequent victim of state collapse – the most striking novelty of the Security Council's agenda in the last two decades (BRASIL, 2009, p. 10, our translation).

[9] A decisive moment in this process took place in 2004, with the creation of the High-level Panel on Threats, Challenges and Changes and the release of its final report, entitled "A Safer World: Our Common Responsibility." Organized at the behest of Kofi Annan, UN Secretary-General at the time, the panel was tasked with examining current global threats, analyzing future challenges to international peace and security, identifying the potential contribution of collective action in regards to addressing these challenges, and proposing recommendations aligned with a broad understanding of peace and security.

The change in the Security Council's operational profile was essential for the new articulations between peacekeeping endeavors and the international security agenda. If between 1945 and 1988 thirteen peace operations had been conducted by the UN, between 1988 and 2006 this number increased to 46 (HIRST, 2016). More than a reflection of the mistakes and successes accumulated during the previous decades, the redefinitions permeating this new functional dynamic appeared as a kind of second chance granted to the Security Council, so it could effectively assume its supposed role as a *gendarme* of world peace (KENNEDY, 2006; HIRST, 2016).

The new agenda upheld by the UN and other international actors emphasized the concept of "peacebuilding," which would become a guiding principle for development-oriented cooperation policies. This term is even more broad and multidimensional than the idea of "post-conflict reconstruction." As a matter of fact, it includes conflict prevention, intervention for the promotion of peace (whenever violence erupts) and aid to tackle immediate or structural (environmental, political, economic and socio-cultural) causes of instability, which must be addressed in order to consolidate peace and prevent violent recurrences (TSCHIRGI, 2003).

Thus, Hirst and Antonini (2011, p. 28) warn us that "while, for international peacekeeping agendas, the theme of post-conflict peacebuilding had encompassed a broad process of institutional reconstruction, a new generation of international interventions expanded the number of actors and functions." Also according to these authors, the breadth of international aid actions demonstrates the wide range of issues that have become central in conflict-resolution processes: building and strengthening institutions that guarantee human rights (with emphasis on certain groups, such as children, women, ethnic, cultural or other minorities); security sector reform (military and police forces); establishment of a reliable and effective judicial system to prevent impunity, and development of an appropriate institutional and legal framework (supported by consultation and political participation processes) for elections; better management of public resources, and provision of essential services, among others. This "integrated intervention agenda (peace, development and human rights)," associated with a new trend towards "aid actions that restructure international cooperation itself," gained an important conceptual and political basis with the UN Report "*In Larger Freedom*", released by Kofi Annan in 2005.

For Sanahuja and Schünemann (2012, p. 26), the increasing emphasis on structural causes reveals the long-term dimension of peacebuilding, which now goes beyond post-conflict recovery and reconstruction. This new conception was also intended as a recognition of the role of civil society in conflict resolution, which would include paying greater attention to the demands of specific groups, as in the participation of women in peacebuilding efforts. Thus, peacebuilding became an explicit goal of development cooperation policies. In many post-conflict situations, this objective contributed to mobilizing additional resources, at least in the short and medium term. The actions of the UN in the field of peacebuilding thus combined assistance-oriented financial flows with expert knowledge from extended civil society, in order to modernize humanitarianism and the technologies used for maintaining global governance in the 21st century.

FROM STATE TO PEOPLE: THE AFFIRMATION OF THE CONCEPTS OF HUMAN SECURITY AND HUMAN DEVELOPMENT

In this new scenario, the typology for potential threats to international security expanded beyond interstate conflicts, establishing a new scenario in debates on world peace and security. International affairs were no longer an issue to be dealt with exclusively at the state level – especially with regards to security – since new threats to world peace would pay no heed to national borders, sustaining an astonishing degree of interconnectedness. This generated a shift in focus for "security issues, from an exclusive subsumption in the state to associations with issues beyond, below and through the state" (RODRIGUES, 2012, p. 8, our translation).

For Hoffmann (2010), the perception of the state as an entity that has to be defended at all costs gives credence to the idea of weakened states as possible dangers to human security. In other words, since the actions taken by certain governments can generate insecurity – especially when they fail to exercise the responsibilities of sovereignty – there is a shift in focus from international state security to human security. "As such, both the object and the subject of security have changed. It no longer refers to threats from other states, but rather to threats from non-state actors within and outside its borders, and these actors primarily threaten the civilian population" (HOFFMANN, 2010, p. 258, our translation).

This paradigm shift was also heavily influenced by the new development debates of the early 1990s. Gradually, discussions and actions on the link between security and development – in which the population was regarded as the main object of policy implementation – moved forward, privileging certain dimensions that had been neglected by a majority of previous researches. However, it is worth mentioning that analyzes indicative of a different perspective on the concepts of security and development were already present in some discussions taking place during the second half of the 20th century.

For example, during the period in which realist approaches dominated discussions of international security, studies in the field of peace research opened up new analytical possibilities. International security studies (ISS) previously prioritized themes strictly within the great powers' agendas, reflecting the conflicts, influences and power relations characteristic of the Cold War period. With the increasing insertion of research approaches and methods from other areas of Social Sciences, however, these debates were invaded by studies which were not interested in a strictly military perspective, allowing peace studies to take their first steps.

According to Buzan and Hansen (2012), in a period when the Vietnam War and the Missile Crisis were the utmost expressions of the bipolar conflict between the United States and the Soviet Union, a restricted analytical perspective prevailed in scientific and academic productions, centered on power disputes, national defense, military aspects and, consequently, upholding the understanding of war as an irreducible phenomenon. Nevertheless, driven by the strengthening of pacifist movements in opposition to the generalization and worsening of violence, the peace-research approach gradually gained more prominence (MACIEL; BIZZO, 2018)[10]. By proposing new approaches and viewpoints regarding international security and paying attention to the contributions of sociological analyzes, these studies highlighted the need for a new emphasis on the concept of peace; moreover, they shed a different light on the relationship between social development and security issues.

[10] However, throughout this *détente*, the realist current did not face any challenges strong enough to dethrone it as the hegemonic discourse in International Relations. In the aftermath of the Cold War, even the 'neo-neo' debate was hardly an anticipation of new discursive rivalries between mainstream views (MACIEL, BIZZO, 2018).

One of the first authors to question the ISS orthodoxy and point out the importance of this relationship was the Norwegian sociologist Johan Galtung. In the midst of the Cold War, Galtung (1969) proposed to change the key conceptual principle of security studies, then highly reliant upon the concepts of "war," "security" and "national defense." According to the author, starting from the idea of "peace," research in the area could expand its scope, including the security-development nexus among its research objects. This proposition resulted in a few approaches which opposed the prevailing traditionalism, with the study of *structural violence* becoming an important reference for the further inclusion of non-military subjects. Thus, in 1968, while McNamara launched a realist defense of the inseparability of security and development, the following year, in the field of peace studies, Galtung proposed a new emphasis on the nexus between these two dimensions.

As such, Galtung is one among several authors who managed to inaugurate new analytical possibilities for international security studies; and these new possibilities would develop further after the Cold War. As a result, in the 1990s, the anthropocentric conceptualization of international security and politics was gradually legitimized (ROTHSCHILD, 1995). Besides disseminating the concept of human rights, peace research gave theoretical support to diplomatic engagement, aiming to establish an objective link between security actions and the ambitious project of global social development – so highly sought after in the post-Cold War period.

Within the scope of the UN, the expansion and reframing of the traditional concept of security to include and confer centrality to the security of individuals led to the concept of human security and, later, to the Responsibility to Protect doctrine, formulated in the early 2000s (GOMES, 2014)[11]. In this scenario, measures in favor of improved living conditions and democratic freedoms gained strength in the UN system, especially within the scope of the United Nations Development

[11] Coined in 2001 by the final report of the International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty (ICISS), the Responsibility to Protect (R2P) concept posits that the sovereignty of a state implies certain responsibilities, and if that state is unwilling or unable to fulfill these responsibilities, the principle of non-intervention has to be forfeited in favor of R2P. This translates into a resignification of sovereignty: its main driver ceases to be "authority" (over a territory and its population) and becomes "responsibility" (which can be questioned if such authority cannot ensure "minimum" human-rights standards). The concept was incorporated into the Declaration published for the occasion of the UN's 70th anniversary, in 2005.

Programme (UNDP)[12]. Among the most publicized UNDP contributions, several Human Development Reports have been published since the early 1990s; these have played an essential role in promoting the terms "human development" and "human security".

The conventional narrative on the emergence and institutionalization of human security finds its roots in the Human Development Report published in 1994 and entitled "New Dimensions of Human Security." This report – which received outstanding support from Boutros-Boutros Ghali, the UN Secretary-General at the time (1992-1996) – sought to identify itself with the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and brought up the concept of *human security*. The latter would have two central goals: to protect people from vulnerabilities resulting from underdevelopment, keeping them safe from chronic threats such as hunger and disease (*freedom from want*); to protect people from sudden and harmful changes in their patterns of daily life caused by systematic physical violence – including wars, genocides and ethnic cleansing (*freedom from fear*).

Through the concept of human security, the UN sought to establish (in the diplomatic field) that the individual should be the main object of international security actions. This broadened the concept of *global civil society*. The strategic knowledge and interventions resulting from this concept put the population at the forefront of a series of new management practices and technologies meant to expand each individual's *human capital*, without diminishing one's control over one's own life. According to the UNDP:

> The concept of security has for too long been interpreted narrowly: as security of territory from external aggression, or as protection of national interests in foreign policy or as global security from the threat of a nuclear holocaust. It has been related more to nation-states than to people. ... With the dark shadows of the cold war receding, one can now see that many conflicts are within nations rather than between nations. (UNDP, 1994, p. 22).

[12] The book "Relações Internacionais e temas sociais: a década das conferências," by José Augusto Lindgren Alves (2001), corroborates the hypothesis of a progressive institutionalization of social themes on the UN agenda, by analyzing several important conferences held in the 1990s.

According to Nef (2002, p. 41, our translation), the paradigm of human security is based on the notion of "mutual vulnerability." In an interdependent global system, the security of the most developed (and, apparently, better protected) sectors of society is conditioned by the vulnerability and extreme insecurity of the most fragile ones. In other words, "as long as there is extreme vulnerability and insecurity in some sectors of the whole, we are all, to some extent, vulnerable." Thus, Nef understands that the central theme of human security has to do with "the reduction of collective (and shared) risk by means of analysis and decision-making, including actions and preventive measures aimed at reducing not only the symptomatic expressions of insecurity, but also their causes and circumstances."

Despite the fact that, by the end of the post-World War II era, this trans-territorial dynamic of threats to international security had already been established, coming from an international organization in favor of human development, the UNDP's analyzes sought to legitimize a new understanding of global governance. For Canada's former foreign minister Lloyd Axworthy, for example, "the concept of human security had to become a central organizing principle in international relations, as well as an important catalyst in a new approach to diplomacy" (BAZZANO, 2014, p. 43, our translation)[13].

Together with many other diplomatic instruments subsequently agreed upon, the 1994 UNDP Human Development Report suggests that the security-development nexus must be promoted by cooperation between the various actors taking part in the sphere of international relations, especially nation-states and supranational organizations. In this sense, the report emphasizes the need to create human-development programs. These would be vehicles for pro-human security actions such as fighting hunger among miserable populations, containing the spread of epidemics, and tackling the scarcity of natural resources and civil conflicts arising from these and other factors of social vulnerability.

[13] According to Sanahuja and Schünemann (2012, p. 25), "human security" is, in many respects – including its claim to universality – a modernization of "liberal peace," since it recognizes and takes upon itself to intervene in favor of development demands that had been integral to the old "North-South" agenda, a legacy of decolonization processes. The aim was to forge a new international consensus in respect to the inseparability of peace, security and development, which can be interpreted as an attempt to "desecuritize" and then "resecuritize" the topic on different bases.

This human development paradigm profoundly influenced the formulation of the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs), approved in 2000 through the Millennium Declaration, and of the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs), approved in 2015 and made effective in the beginning of 2016. The increase in global social demands was one of these agendas' most striking points. Both the MDGs and SDGs are permeated by concepts of human security and development, setting goals for overcoming problems in the areas of health, poverty, environment, etc. These debates have been central to the establishment of new guidelines in international pro-development cooperation. As Ayllón (2006, p. 9) reminds us, "development cooperation must answer to the challenges posed by the post-Cold War international scenario, dominated by the forces of globalization and the emergence of new and complex transnational problems." Thus, the MDGs and SDGs have contributed to the definition of new aid priorities whose focus lies squarely on new threats to international security.

THE SECURITY-DEVELOPMENT NEXUS AND THE SECURITIZATION OF INTERNATIONAL AID

The emphasis on the relationship between security and development also took on new meanings at the beginning of the 21st century. On the one hand, during the 1990s, donor governments – notably those linked to the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) – and multilateral institutions highlighted the need for a more comprehensive approach, in which these two dimensions would be mutually reinforcing. On the other hand, after the 9/11 attacks, the security-development nexus assumed new dimensions, especially in respect to the foreign aid priorities of countries which were eager to sponsor the fight against terrorism. In this context, although global social demands aligned with concepts of human security and development have not been entirely put aside, in some cases their fulfilling has been postponed or reinterpreted in light of anti-terrorist policies.

For Sanahuja and Schünemann (2012), the so-called "Global War on Terror" can be considered a watershed in this process. In addition to the appearance of broader, "developmentalist" concepts of security and peacebuilding in the immediate post-Cold War period, the authors bring up the rise of strongly "securitized" views in the post-9/11 period, discussing

their influence over development and cooperation policies. The post-Cold War period would therefore demonstrate both the attempt to redefine security from the point of view of human security and peacebuilding, incorporating dimensions of sustainable human development, and the process of "securitization" of development cooperation policies, now carried out as chapters in the narrative of the "War on Terror."

The renewed post-9/11 interest in "failed" or "fragile states" can be pointed out as a significant example of the securitization of aid and cooperation policies at the international level. Arguments sustaining that such states are unable to provide security and other public services to their own citizens are intermingled with the idea that they represent threats to the international community's security, precisely because of their actual or potential vulnerability in the face of contemporary dangerous actors, including international terrorism and organized crime.

For Sanahuja and Schünemann (2012), this led to the prevalence, during this period, of views such as the World Bank's – according to which "fragile states" were a potential source of regional and global instability and insecurity. According to James Wolfensohn, the Bank's ninth president, poverty reduction became more important than ever in a situation where failed states function as a breeding ground for terrorism. This type of conception coexisted with broader definitions, which emphasized the pro-development and human security dimensions. Thus, for the OECD's Development Assistance Committee (DAC), a state is "fragile" when its structures allow for no political leeway or political will to provide the basic functions necessary in the reduction of poverty, in the promotion of development and in the guarantee of security and human rights to its people. In addition to international organizations, several countries active in global governance either had very different ideas of what the term "fragile state" really meant or entirely disagreed with the very use of the concept.

> This sheds light on the fact that in the donor-state community there is no homogeneous concept of what a "fragile state" is, nor a common terminology – there is also talk of "failed states" and "weak states," "states in crisis" and, according to the World Bank, "low-income countries under stress" (LICUS). As such, it is clear that the securitization process remains a highly debated and contested trend. (SANAHUJA; SCHÜNEMANN, 2012, p. 54).

For Rocha (2009, p. 207, our translation), "the term 'fragile state' refers to the fundamental objective" of "strengthening conditions for the state in question to provide essential services to its populations." As such, its primary tenet is that "through structured programs and cooperation projects, the international community contributes to reinforce a certain state, expanding its capacity to achieve the proposed objectives" (ibidem). Such a conception surpasses the scope of "development agencies" like the World Bank, aiming to establish broader strategies for action in failed states. The Washington Consensus would be the most well-known set of prescriptions exhibiting this all-encompassing impetus. Thus, according to Rocha, the concept of "failed state" takes on "more complex" contours when we recognize that:

> By assuming the bankruptcy of local institutions – assessed on the basis of the ideal parameters used by modern Western democracies – the international community is implicitly assigned the responsibility of restoring public authority in those places, in the name of ensuring the fundamental rights of human beings, starting with security (ROCHA, 2009, p. 207, our translation).

According to Gomes (2014), both conceptions are based on the understanding that these post-colonial states suffer from *capacity-problems*, preventing them from properly dealing with complex, specific constraints in the economic, social and political spheres. Thus, these states would be the clearest examples of the intersection between development and security agendas. The increasing prevalence of discourse on how 'non-functional' states are allegedly characterized by stability and violence (CRAMER, 2006) would demonstrate that they have been unable to foster forms of sustainable development capable of maintaining a safe and stable society. In the same sense, they allegedly lacked an environment of security and peace able to guarantee long-term development.

Haiti is a good example of an increasingly prevalent approach to deep structural problems of poverty and insufficient governance, according to which these are global security issues – not only human security issues, but also, and above all, threats to international peace and security, as seen in the UN's Security Council resolutions regarding the MINUSTAH mandate. For Malacalza (2014), the restructuring of cooperation between the United States and Haiti was integral to the National Security Strategy

(NSS) after the 9/11 attacks (*The National Security Strategy of the United States of America*). The strategy followed the "three Ds" approach (defense, diplomacy and development) to fragile states as its main point of reference.

Released in September 2002, the NSS stated that fragile states represented a fundamental danger to US national security, attributing the causes of transnational threats to those states' deficiencies. In the same document, the White House declares that conquering states would be less of a threat to the United States than failed ones[14]. In this context, the USA started to treat Haiti as a special actor in the Caribbean group, seeing it as a danger to regional and international security, based on the failed-state prescriptive approach (HIRST, 2011). Following this logic, the American position was to attempt to strategically submit MINUSTAH to Chapter VII, which provides for the imposition of peace. The immediate consequence of this orientation was the securitization of the Haitian agenda, granting the US Departments of State and Defense a more central role, in addition to redefining the work of the United States Agency for International Development (USAID).

The wide applicability of the concept of failed or fragile state led to a controversial diagnosis of Haiti's situation, in which the consequences of the Haitian state's alleged deficiencies were exaggerated, dismissing the failures of international aid itself (and pointing to cooperation as the solution for the Haitian crisis, as if these failures had not happened). Faced with fears that the Haitian crisis would trigger a wave of illegal immigration to the United States and increase illegal activities such as drug trafficking, the Bush administration "prioritized building new public security institutions, logistical support and humanitarian aid, which would be channeled through MINUSTAH, NGOs and private companies" (MALACALZA, 2014, p. 59, our translation).

Similarly, the European Union identified Haiti as a pilot case in its fragile-state assistance policy. This led it to assess aid policy through an increasingly "securitized" prism (despite the lack of coordination between European countries' bilateral agendas). The UE is especially concerned, for example, with the links of Haitians and Dominicans to drug trafficking rings active in the European market. Since the beginning of the Préval government, "the European preference was to focus its contributions to Haiti on the area of development cooperation, while simultaneously

[14] In the original text: "America is now threatened less by conquering states than we are by failing ones" (WHITE HOUSE, 2012).

assisting the UN with its security and internal stabilization tasks, emphasizing police training" (HIRST, 2011, p. 231, our translation).

Among contemporary studies of security, the Copenhagen School puts visible emphasis on the "securitization" of international cooperation. This notion is based on the principle that security threats are social constructs, since security is characterized by discursive and political elements. According to this perspective, the notion of "human security" betrays a securitization 'intention' rather than a new attempt to conceptualize or analyze security.

For the school's representatives, specific issues are opportunely elected by certain actors to be turned into security problems. While the state has a prominent role in this process, other agents are also essential in what amounts to an intersubjective construction of securitization (BUZAN, 1998, p. 29-31): international organizations, the media, representatives of civil society, think tanks, etc. Within this dynamic, for an issue to be regarded as a security problem, it must first be socially established as an existential threat, by means of intersubjective practices (ibidem). In summary, this analysis of securitization processes demonstrates that no phenomenon is inherently related to "security" or genuinely "dangerous" agents, values or practices. On the contrary, certain groups, themes and initiatives are identified as "threats" by means of speech acts (production of speeches), thus becoming "existential threats" to some "referent object" (BUZAN; WÆVER; DE WILDE, 1998, p. 36).

As such, careful analyzes regarding the origins of the supposed "threats" motivating interventions in "failed states" – such as Haiti – reveal the falsehood of the tacit assumption that these "security problems" are immanent and perennial in character. For Duffield (2007), interventions by the international community in these states – based on the need to apply development policies to enable the reduction of violence, the establishment of security and the creation of a stable environment – would have the effect of *securitizing development*.

The securitization process of international cooperation projects manifests itself in various ways, including: forms of discursive logic that legitimize these projects; redefinition of the concepts and milestones orienting adopted policies; mobilization of extraordinary resources; changes in projects' resource-distribution patterns; redefinition of democratic governance according to new standards. A case in point is the fact that, since 2004, Iraq has been the world's largest recipient of Official

Development Assistance (ODA). Meanwhile, Afghanistan has been moving up the list, taking second place in 2008. Between 2005 and 2009, Iraq and Afghanistan absorbed between 10% and 16% of all global ODA (SANAHUJA; SCHÜNEMANN, 2012).

Far from being a mere rhetorical sleight of hand, this renewed emphasis on the security-development nexus has brought about concrete changes affecting many actors linked to the promotion of development, such as bilateral donors and multilateral organizations, prompting them to engage in activities traditionally associated with security. The inverse occurs with actors who are more closely linked to security issues, as these have expanded their roles to also deal with development issues (ABDENUR; NETO, 2014). Therefore, several actions justified by the argument of a security-development nexus could be interventionist practices in-disguise, providing an aura of "progressiveness" to unpalatable policies and actions. However, if the security-development nexus has become commonplace in national and global policies, could it be said that this conceptual relationship might be applied in different ways? (STERN; ÖJENDAL, 2010).

In this sense, it should be noted that several countries in the South (Brazil among them)[15] criticize the understanding of this relationship advanced by the great powers, as it would result in an increasing "securitization of development" to legitimize their self-interested security priorities. Aid projects by countries of the Global North would obfuscate objectives that are in fact much more strongly associated with strict security matters. These implicit objectives would be the ones to ultimately determine the priorities of development projects. We should also point out the link between "the progressive securitization of aid" to states considered fragile and the investment interests of foreign companies, as explained by Sogge (2015, p. 18). As we can see, there is a complex interplay between official arguments in favor of certain development assistance and cooperation projects and their derived or obfuscated functions. However, one would not be advised to ignore the extent to which this criticism can be applied to countries of the Global South. These actors are likely to avoid the recognition that their actions are also subject to apparent contradictions

[15] See the speech "Maintenance of international peace and security: the interdependence between security and development" by Antonio Patriota on the occasion of the United Nations Security Council's High-Level Open Debate on the interdependence between security and development, New York, February 11, 2011 (PATRIOTA, 2013).

between discourse and practice in the fields of security and development. Thus, certain discourses and practices of cooperation between countries in the South might have a somewhat "self-legitimizing" character.

For example: in view of the increasing presence of some countries of the so-called Global South in the arena of international relations – including peacekeeping and post-conflict reconstruction missions – can we really ascertain that these states have a truly differentiated understanding of the link between security and development? In other words, can we ascertain that South-to-South cooperation projects have strictly development-related motivations? In a context wherein some countries of the Global South are ceasing to be objects of cooperation and development-assistance projects to become their agents, can we find elements of securitization in their actions?

Considering this panorama, our understanding is that the analysis of the interdependence between security and development provides important evidence about the role of several international actors in the globally articulated management of threats to global governance.

FINAL CONSIDERATIONS

Since the immediate post-World War II period, global-conflict dynamics have been moving towards increased confrontations – prompted by non-state groups – within and across borders. In other words, since the middle of the 20th century, civil wars and other trans-territorial threats have been leaving their marks on the international system. However, this movement was reinforced and gained new features in the international order that rose after the Cold War.

In contemporaneity, international security has moved on to encompass a wide range of issues, such as the environment and human rights, demanding specific knowledge and expertise. Moreover, it implies a more active and institutionalized participation of a diversity of actors to tackle multiple international issues. Since the 1990s, the expansion of the factors driving the debates on world peace and security was aligned with discourses highlighting the need for concerted actions by international agents in the name of a new world order, based on allegedly universal values (such as liberal democracy and human development).

Thus, this article attempted to identify some elements that permeate contemporary conceptions about the security-development

nexus, aiming, on the one hand, to expose some of its origins, and, on the other, to understand how this relationship gained new contours – either practical or normative – in the post-Cold War period. In that sense, we sought to analyze concepts such as human security and human development, questioning their use and effects over UN peacekeeping operations and over the securitization of international cooperation. We hope to have contributed to a recognition of this relationship's importance, clarifying that the debates around it are still open, justifying deeper revisions and investigations.

O NEXO ENTRE SEGURANÇA E DESENVOLVIMENTO NO PÓS-GUERRA FRIA

RESUMO

Diante do interesse por identificar alguns elementos que são determinantes para as concepções contemporâneas da relação entre segurança e desenvolvimento, este artigo visa a compreender como esse nexo ganhou novos contornos no pós-Guerra Fria. Inicialmente, é apresentada uma discussão sucinta sobre a relação entre segurança e desenvolvimento durante a Guerra Fria. Em seguida, são problematizados processos interdependentes que perpassam tal nexo na contemporaneidade: as mudanças no escopo das operações de construção da paz da ONU; a ascensão dos conceitos de segurança humana e desenvolvimento humano; e, por fim, a securitização da ajuda internacional e sua articulação com o conceito de Estado falido. Desta forma, busca-se contribuir com a perspectiva de que os debates sobre esse nexo no pós-Guerra Fria são dinâmicos e estão em aberto, havendo a necessidade de aprofundamento dos estudos sobre o tema.

Palavras-chave: Segurança. Desenvolvimento. Pós-Guerra Fria.

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